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INTRODUCTION
Inspector Harry Callahan is not pleased with the Supreme Court.1
The fictional San Francisco homicide detective, famously portrayed by
Clint Eastwood in the film Dirty Harry, has just captured a sadistic
serial killer known as Scorpio.2 There is just one problem: Scorpio’s
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment3 rights were violated
when Callahan kicked in his door and searched his home without a
warrant, denied him medical treatment, and tortured him in order to
elicit a confession.4 Also, because Callahan failed to read Scorpio the
Miranda warnings, crucial evidence discovered subsequent to the
confession would have to be suppressed.5 When told that the charges
have been dropped because Scorpio’s constitutional rights were
* J.D candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law; University of
Illinois at Chicago, M.B.A., May 2010; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
B.S., Psychology, May 2001.
1
DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971).
2
Id.
3
U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI & XIV.
4
DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971).
5
Id.
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violated, Callahan growls: “Well I’m all broke up about that man’s
rights.”6 Callahan then weighs in on the exclusionary rule: “Well then,
the law is crazy.”7
It is, of course, preposterous (although admittedly entertaining)
that a seasoned homicide detective would be so ignorant of Supreme
Court criminal procedure jurisprudence that the serial killer is to go
free because the inspector has blundered.8 However, in the decades
following the release of Dirty Harry, police departments in the United
States were encouraging their officers not to brazenly flout the
mandates of the Supreme Court like Inspector Callahan, but to craft
techniques to circumvent the protections that the Court had bestowed
on suspects in criminal investigations.9 One such technique was the
two-step interrogation.10
The two-step interrogation was most recently presented to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. Johnson.11 In Johnson, the defendant appealed, inter alia, the
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin’s denial of a
motion to suppress his post-arrest statements.12 The defendant sought
the suppression of the statements based on the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Missouri v. Seibert.13 Seibert directly addressed the
6

Id.
Id.
8
Id. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926) (Cardozo, J., famously
stating: “The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”).
9
See generally Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda:
Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda,
84 MINN. L. REV. 397 (1999).
10
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 328–29 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Arthur S. Aubry & Rudolph R. Caputo, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 290 (3d
ed. 1980)) (“Standard interrogation manuals advise that ‘[t]he securing of the first
admission is the biggest stumbling block.’ If this first admission can be obtained,
‘there is every reason to expect that the first admission will lead to others, and
eventually to the full confession.’”).
11
680 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2012).
12
Id. at 978. See United States v. Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 2d 904 (D.Wis. 2005).
13
542 U.S. 600 (2004); Johnson, 680 F.3d at 978–79.
7
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two-step interrogation technique, where investigators would withhold
Miranda warnings during custodial questioning until a confession was
obtained.14 After confessing, the suspect would be advised of their
Miranda rights and investigators would proceed to elicit an identical
(and now admissible) statement.15
Seibert was a deeply divided plurality opinion that produced two
potential tests for evaluating the admissibility of two-step
interrogations.16 Justice Souter wrote for a four-Justice plurality,
announcing a multi-factor test to determine whether Miranda warnings
“delivered midstream could be effective.”17 Justice Kennedy,
concurring only in the judgment of the Court, wrote separately,
arguing for an intent-based test that examined whether law
enforcement used the procedure deliberately.18
In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant was not
entitled to relief under Seibert, stating as dictum: “We have yet to
determine which [Seibert] test governs in this circuit.”19 This is an
understatement. The Seventh Circuit has struggled to consistently
apply one Seibert test over another, frustrating any lower court’s
search for viable binding precedent. This Note will summarize the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Miranda and Seibert, examine the
Seventh Circuit’s inconsistent application of Seibert, and advocate for
the abandonment of the intent-based test espoused by Justice Kennedy
in his concurring opinion in Seibert.20

14

Id. at 604; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 615.
18
Id. at 618–22
19
Johnson, 680 F.3d at 978–79.
20
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Seibert, 542 U.S. 600.
15
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I. MIRANDA
In 1966, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Miranda
v. Arizona.21 Miranda held that statements made by a suspect as a
result of custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless law
enforcement first warns the suspect of certain constitutional rights.22
Specifically, the suspect must be “clearly informed” that: (1) he has
the right to remain silent; (2) anything he says can and will be used
against him in court; (3) he has the right to consult with an attorney
before the interrogation and to have an attorney present during
interrogation; and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed to represent him.23 Miranda did not mandate that the
warnings must be given exactly as written in the opinion, but law
enforcement must follow “procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right[s].”24
In order for a suspect’s statement to be introduced in court, the
prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Miranda rights were waived.25 A waiver is valid only when the suspect
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently relinquishes his rights.26 To
assess the validity of a waiver, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation;27 relevant factors include
the suspect’s age, physical and mental condition, intelligence and
education, and familiarity with the criminal justice system.28

21

384 U.S. 436.
Id. at 467–73.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 467.
25
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).
26
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
27
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
28
See e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)
22
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II. SEIBERT
In Missouri v. Seibert the Court held that the “two-step”
interrogation technique undermines the effectiveness of the Miranda
warnings and thus invalidates a suspect’s waiver.29 The Court noted
that technique of “interrogating in successive, unwarned and warned
phases raises a new challenge to Miranda.”30
A. The Facts
Patrice Seibert’s twelve year-old son Jonathan, who suffered from
cerebral palsy, died in his sleep.31 Fearing she would be charged with
neglect, Seibert, along with two of her sons (and some of their
friends), schemed to burn down the family’s trailer home with
Jonathan’s body inside.32 To dispel any suspicion that Jonathan had
been left unsupervised, the plan also included allowing Donald Rector,
a mentally ill teenager living with the family, to perish in the fire.33
Seibert was arrested five days after the fire was set, at the hospital
bedside of one of her sons, who was severely burned during the
commission of the arson.34 Prior to the arrest, Officer Richard
Hanrahan of the Rolla, Missouri police department, instructed the
arresting officer to not read Seibert the Miranda warnings.35 At the
police station, Seibert was left alone in an interrogation room for
fifteen to twenty minutes.36 Without reading Seibert the Miranda
warnings, Hanrahan interrogated her for thirty to forty minutes, during
which time Seibert confessed that she knew that Rector’s death was

29

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
Id. at 609.
31
Id. at 604.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
30
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part of the arson plot.37 After a fifteen to twenty minute break,
Hanrahan advised Seibert of the Miranda warnings, activated an audio
recorder, and asked her to repeat her confession.38
At times during the second interrogation, Hanrahan confronted
Seibert with specific admissions she had made during the initial
interrogation, pressuring her to admit that she knew there “was [an]
understanding about Donald [Rector].”39 Referring to the initial
interrogation, Hanrahan asked Seibert: “ ‘Trice, didn’t you tell me that
[Rector] was supposed to die in his sleep?”40 Ultimately, Seibert’s
warned (i.e., post-Miranda) statement, subsequent to a detailed thirty
to forty minute unwarned interrogation, resulted in Seibert being
charged with first-degree murder.41
B. Lower Court Decisions
Before trial in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Seibert sought
the suppression of both statements.42 The trial court suppressed the
initial statement but admitted the statement made after the Miranda
recitation.43 Seibert was convicted of second-degree murder.44
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the two-step
interrogation was indistinguishable from Oregon v. Elstad, in which a
suspect was inadvertently not read Miranda warnings during a brief
initial questioning.45 Elstad held that “[a] subsequent administration of
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions

37

Id. at 605.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 606.
44
Id.
45
Id.; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985).
38
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that precluded admission of the earlier statement.”46 Thus, there is no
presumption of coercive effect where the suspect’s initial statement
was voluntary.47 Elstad directed courts to examine the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating the voluntariness of the post-warning
statement.48 The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s
decision, finding that Seibert’s second statement was voluntary per
Elstad.49
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that both of
Seibert’s statements should have been excluded because Hanrahan’s
initial interrogation was lengthy and detailed, and the specific
admissions of Seibert’s initial statement were exploited by Hanrahan
in the second interrogation as he urged her to repeat her confession.50
The court distinguished Elstad, in that Hanrahan had deliberately
withheld advising Seibert of her Miranda warnings as opposed to an
unintentional violation.51
The State of Missouri petitioned the United States Supreme Court;
certiorari was granted to answer the question of whether a deliberate
withholding of Miranda warnings mandates the suppression of postwarning statements.52
C. The Plurality Opinion
Seibert’s conviction was reversed and remanded in a five to four
plurality decision.53 The plurality, Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg
and Breyer, held that the two-step interrogation tactic employed by
Hanrahan required the suppression of Seibert’s second statement,
46

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314.
Id. at 318.
48
Id.
49
State of Missouri v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 WL 114804 at *8–9 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2002) (unpublished).
50
See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 606.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 607.
53
Id.
47

105

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 1

Fall 2012

finding that “the object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings
ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them,
after the suspect has already confessed.”54 The Court noted that the
reason for the technique’s nationwide popularity was obvious: “to get
a confession the suspect would not make if he understood his rights at
the outset.”55 The Court reasoned that “[u]pon hearing warnings only
in the aftermath of interrogation and just after making a confession, a
suspect would hardly think he had a genuine right to remain silent, let
alone persist in so believing once the police began to lead him over the
same ground again.”56 For the plurality, the threshold issue was
whether in these types of circumstances the warnings could function
“effectively” as Miranda requires.57
The plurality found five factors determinative as to whether
“warnings delivered midstream” could be effective: (1) “the
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round
of interrogation;” (2) “the overlapping content of the two statements;”
(3) “the timing and setting of the first and the second [interrogations];”
(4) “the continuity of police personnel;” and (5) “the degree to which
the interrogator’s questions treated the second [interrogation] as
continuous with the first.”58
Applying these factors to the facts of Seibert’s case, the Court
found relevant that the unwarned interrogation took place at the police
station; that the questioning was “systematic, exhaustive, and managed
with psychological skill;” and that the two interrogations were
separated by only 15 to 20 minutes and conducted in the same
location.59 Particularly bothersome to the plurality was that “[n]othing
was said or done to dispel the oddity of warning about legal rights to
silence and counsel right after the police had led [Seibert] through a

54

Id. at 611.
Id. at 613.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 611–12.
58
Id. at 615.
59
Id. at 616.
55
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systematic interrogation.”60 The result, the Court concluded, was that
“a reasonable person in the [Seibert’s] shoes would not have
understood [the Miranda warnings] to convey a message that she
retained a choice about continuing to talk.”61
D. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
Justice Kennedy joined in the judgment, but wrote a separate
concurring opinion, believing that the plurality’s objective inquiry
from the perspective of the suspect, which would apply in the both
intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations, was too
broad.62 Justice Kennedy advocated a narrower test applicable only
when “the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated
way to undermine the Miranda warning.”63 Justice Kennedy described
circumstances in which unintentional two-step interrogations may
occur:
An officer may not realize that a suspect is in custody and
warnings are required. The officer may not plan to question
the suspect or may be waiting for a more appropriate time.
Skilled investigators often interview suspects multiple times,
and good police work may involve referring to prior
statements to test their veracity or to refresh recollection.64
Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, unless a court finds that the
procedure was deliberate, Elstad controls, requiring an inquiry only
into whether the statements were made voluntarily and without
coercion.65

60

Id.
Id. at 617.
62
Id. at 621–22.
63
Id. at 622.
64
Id. at 620.
65
Id. at 622.
61
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Justice Kennedy’s test, with its deliberateness requirement, also
provided that “postwarning statements that are related to the substance
of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures
are taken before the postwarning statement is made.”66 Curative
measures are measures “designed to ensure that a reasonable person in
the suspect's situation would understand the import and effect of the
Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver,” such as “a substantial
break in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement
and the Miranda warning” or “an additional warning that explains the
likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement.”67 While
two tests emerged from Seibert, the facts of the case mandated
suppression of the second statement under both standards.
III. SEIBERT’S PROGENY IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. Stewart I, II, and III
On November 9, 2004, the Seventh Circuit decided United States
v. Stewart.68 The defendant, Timothy Stewart appealed his conviction
for armed bank robbery and use of a firearm during a crime of
violence, contending that the admission of his confession at trial
violated Seibert.69 Stewart was detained after police established a
checkpoint near the recently-robbed bank, because he matched the
description of the suspect and because he could not provide a plausible
explanation of where he was going or where he had been during the
time of the robbery.70 Stewart voluntarily got into the car of two
Evansville, Indiana police detectives and asked them to “drive” and to

66

Id.
Id.
68
388 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2004) (Stewart I).
69
Id. at 1081.
70
Id. at 1082.
67
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“take [him] downtown.”71 When one of the detectives asked him why,
Stewart responded: “Well, you're going to arrest me anyway.”72
While being transported to the police station, the detectives
questioned Stewart for approximately five minutes.73 At the police
station, the questioning continued for twenty minutes, with two FBI
agents participating in the interrogation; Stewart subsequently
confessed to committing the robbery.74 At this point, one of the
detectives read Stewart the Miranda warnings; Stewart signed a
waiver, answered questions for another hour, and made a taperecorded confession.75 The confession was admitted at trial and
Stewart was convicted.76
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded:
On the record before us . . . we cannot determine whether the
admission of Stewart's confession was improper under
Seibert, or, if not improper under Seibert, whether the initial
unwarned confession would flunk the voluntariness standard
of Elstad . . . More specifically, the record does not speak to
whether the two-step interrogation in this case was
deliberately used in circumvention of Miranda. If it was, then
the analysis of the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence merge, requiring an inquiry into the sufficiency
of the break in time and circumstances between the unwarned
and warned confessions.77

71

Id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1083.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1091.
72

109
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Remanding the case for further evidentiary findings, the court
indicated it would apply a hybrid of the two tests established in
Seibert.78
On remand, the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
held an evidentiary hearing and found that Stewart's interrogation was
not an “end run” around Miranda.79 The court stated: “There is no
evidence that the [Evansville Police Department] has ever had a policy
which employs the two-step interrogation technique, nor evidence that
the EPD has ever trained or instructed their officers to employ such a
technique.”80 Stewart again appealed.81
In Stewart II, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court's
analysis was improperly narrowed to whether the Evansville Police
Department had an official policy encouraging two-step interrogation
or provided training instructing officers to use the technique.82 The
court found that “[t]hese considerations are potentially relevant to the
broader question of officer intent but by themselves are by no means
dispositive of the issue.”83
Because the district court’s decision did not make factual findings
necessary to determine whether the two-step interrogation was
calculated, the court again remanded the case, with instructions for the
district court to make more specific findings regarding whether “the
officers intentionally withheld Miranda warnings as part of a
deliberate strategy to elicit inculpatory statements in circumvention of
Miranda.”84
The district court entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, ruling that the two-step procedure was not a
deliberate “end run” around Miranda, because the lead investigator did

78

Id. at 1092.
United States v. Stewart, 191 F. Appx 495, 496 (7th Cir. 2006) (Stewart II).
80
Id. at 498.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
79
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not believe Stewart was in custody because Stewart requested to enter
the detectives’ car and demanded to be driven to the police station.85
The Seventh Circuit, in Stewart III, affirmed the judgment of the
district court, holding that “[t]he question of whether the interrogating
officer deliberately withheld Miranda warnings will invariably turn on
the credibility of the officer's testimony in light of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This is a factual finding
entitled to deference on appeal.”86 The court added: (1) that “the
government bears the burden of proving the police did not deliberately
withhold the warnings until after they had an initial inculpatory
statement in hand”; (2) that delayed Miranda warnings do not always
“give rise to an inference of deliberateness”; and (3) that “the lack of
overlap between the warned and unwarned statements is evidence that
the interrogator did not deliberately use a two-step strategy designed to
circumvent Miranda.”87
The Seventh Circuit’s analyses in the Stewart cases invoke a
hybrid of the Seibert plurality’s factor-based test and Justice
Kennedy’s deliberateness requirement.88 Stewart provides that, when
the tactic is intentional, the second statement in a two-step
interrogation should be presumptively excluded.89 However, this
presumption can be overcome by a showing that the Miranda
warnings were “effective;” a showing that can be made by applying
the plurality’s factor-based test.90 However, “[w]here the initial

85

United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2008) (Stewart III).
Id. at 719–20.
87
Id. at 719–22. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
6.8(b) n.49 (West 3d ed. 2012).
88
See United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir.2004); United States v.
Stewart, 191 F. Appx 495 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714
(7th Cir. 2008).
89
United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2008). See Eric English,
Note, You Have the Right to Remain Silent. Now Please Repeat Your Confession:
Missouri v. Seibert and the Court's Attempt to Put an End to the Question-First
Technique, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 423, 462–63 (2006).
90
Id.
86

111
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violation of Miranda was not part of a deliberate strategy to
undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.”91
B. Heron
Less than one year after Stewart III was decided, the Seventh
Circuit was again confronted with a two-step interrogation in U.S. v.
Heron.92 In Heron, the district court admitted the defendant’s second
statement, using Justice Kennedy’s intent-based test.93 The Seventh
Circuit held that the statement was admissible under either test, stating
that there was “no need here to resolve once and for all what rule or
rules governing two-step interrogations can be distilled from
Seibert.”94 However, announcing a departure from the Stewart hybrid
test, the Heron court invoked the Marks standard regarding plurality
decisions.95 The Marks standard provides that “[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”96 The Heron court concluded
that when a concurrence that provides the vote necessary to reach a
majority does not provide a “common denominator” for the judgment,
the Marks rule is inapplicable.97 Since only Justice Breyer’s
concurrence could possibly be read to support Justice Kennedy’s test,
“[the intent-based test] is obviously not the ‘common denominator’
that Marks was talking about.”98

91

United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir.2004).
564 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2009).
93
Id. at 883–84.
94
Id. at 885.
95
Id. at 883–85.
96
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation
omitted).
97
Heron, 564 F.3d at 884.
98
Id. at 885.
92

112
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The Heron court conceded that a “defendant-focused” effects test
“may be in some tension with our decision in Stewart,” and also
characterized the court’s holding in Stewart I as mere “tentative
statements.”99 The court stated that “nothing in the Seibert plurality
opinion condemns us to a mechanical counting of items on a list. We
must instead examine each one of them for the light it throws on the
central inquiry: whether the later Miranda warnings were effective.”100
The court in Heron therefore clearly indicated (albeit in dicta) its
preference for the effects test and forecasted a potential abandonment
of both the hybrid and intent-based test.101
C. Other Seventh Circuit Decisions
Subsequent Seventh Circuit decisions reveal that the issue is far
from resolved. In United States v. Dixie, the court (citing Stewart I)
stated “we have previously explained that Justice Kennedy's separate
concurrence represents the narrowest ground of the decision”;102 in
United States v. Lee, the court cited Heron: “[T]his Court has yet to
choose which test should govern”;103 in United States v. Littledale,
citing Stewart III: “There can be no finding of an improper two-step
interrogation . . . unless the officers deliberately withheld Miranda
warnings until after the suspect confessed”;104 in United States v.
Vallar: “We have construed Seibert as holding ‘that post-warning
statements are inadmissible if they duplicate pre-warning statements
intentionally elicited in an effort to evade Miranda ”;105 and, most

99

Id.
Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
101
See id.
102
382 F. App’x 517, 520 (7th Cir. 2010).
103
618 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir.2010) (applying both the tests of the plurality
opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Seibert, without determining which is
controlling).
104
652 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2011).
105
635 F.3d 271, 285–86 (7th Cir. 2011).
100

113
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recently, in Johnson: “We have yet to determine which [Seibert] test
governs in this circuit.”106
IV. THE INTENT-BASED TEST SHOULD BE ABANDONED
While seven circuit courts have expressly chosen the intent-based
test;107 other circuits have properly noted the difficulties in
determining the proper test arising from Seibert.108 The intent-based
test should be abandoned by the Seventh Circuit, because (1) the
Marks rule regarding plurality decisions does not mandate courts to
adopt the intent-based test; (2) the intent-based test is contrary to
precedent because subjective intent has never before been relevant for
purposes of Miranda and criminal procedure in general; and (3) the
intent-based test furthers the harmful erosion of Miranda’s protections.
A. The Marks Rule Regarding Plurality Decisions is Inapplicable
The Marks rule holds that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’”109 However, in practice, the Marks rule has
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significant limitations.110 The Supreme Court has noted that “[w]e
think it not useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical
possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower
courts that have considered it.”111
In Seibert, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence states that the relevant
inquiry is subjective deliberateness on the part of law enforcement, not
the objective effectiveness factors of the plurality opinion.112 However,
three of the four Justices in the plurality and the four dissenting
Justices expressly rejected consideration of the interrogator’s intent.113
Writing for the dissent, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, stated:
[T]he plurality correctly declines to focus its analysis on the
subjective intent of the interrogating officer. . . . The plurality's
rejection of an intent-based test is . . . correct . . . [b]ecause
voluntariness is a matter of the suspect's state of mind [and]. . .
[t]houghts kept inside a police officer's head cannot affect that
experience. . . . [F]ocusing constitutional analysis on a police
officer's subjective intent [is] an unattractive proposition that we
all but uniformly avoid.114
This demonstrates that, although Justice Kennedy cast the fifth and
deciding vote for the judgment of the Court, his concurring opinion is
not the narrowest holding supported by a majority of the Court as
required by Marks.115 As a dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit has
explained, “all but one of the central points of Seibert enjoys the
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112
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support of five Justices: The rejection of subjective intent enjoys the
assent of at least seven Justices.”116
Because the Marks rule is not dispositive as to which Seibert
opinion is controlling, courts are not bound to adopt or even
incorporate Justice Kennedy’s intent-based test when analyzing twostep interrogations.
B. The Intent-Based Test is Contrary to Precedent
While Justices O’Connor, Stevens, and Thomas dissented in
judgment from the plurality, Justice O’Connor’s opinion stands boldly,
alongside three members of the plurality, for a rejection of the intentbased test proposed by Justice Kennedy.117 In Justice O’Connor’s
opinion, the intent-based test is contrary to the Fifth Amendment in
that the “[f]reedom from compulsion [that] lies at the heart of the Fifth
Amendment . . . requires us to assess whether a suspect’s decision to
speak truly was voluntary.”118 Additionally, according to Justice
O'Connor, the Court has unequivocally “reject[ed] an intent-based test
in several criminal procedure contexts,”119 such as New York v.
Quarles,120 and Whren v. United States.121 An examination of these and
other cases makes clear that the subjective intent of law enforcement
should never be a relevant inquiry.
Quarles carved out an exception to Miranda that allowed law
enforcement to question a suspect without providing Miranda
warnings when public safety is a concern; responses to the questioning
are admissible at the suspect's trial.122 The Court believed that “police
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between
116

United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1141 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Berzon, J., dissenting).
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Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622–628 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
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Quarles, 467 U.S. 649.
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questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the
public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence
from a suspect.”123 The Court made clear that the application of the
public safety exception to Miranda “should not be made to depend on
post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective
motivation of the arresting officer.”124
Whren held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
pretextual traffic stops.125 Prior to Whren, some courts used a test that
focused solely on the motivation of the law enforcement official for
initiating the traffic stop;126 however, subjective motivation—often
criticized for its difficulty in administration—was contrary to prior
decisions holding that reasonableness per the Fourth Amendment was
not a subjective inquiry.127 The Whren court definitively stated that
“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.”128
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court affirmed the application of
Miranda to driving under the influence cases.129 The Court held, with
regard to Miranda, “[a] policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing
on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular
time;” rather, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”130
Moran v. Burbine held that pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, law enforcement has no obligation to inform a suspect
who has not requested an attorney that one is present and wishes to
123

Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 656.
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Whren, 517 U.S. at 813–14 .
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See Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the
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468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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Id. at 421–22. See also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323–324
(1994) (A custody determination “depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating
officers or the person being questioned.”).
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speak to the suspect.131 The Court held that, “whether intentional or
inadvertent, the state of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question
of the intelligence and voluntariness of respondent’s election to
abandon his [Miranda] rights.”132
In Beckwith v. United States, the Court held that Miranda
warnings were not required to be given to a suspect who made
incriminating statements to IRS agents during non-custodial
questioning at the suspect’s home.133 The Court stated that the agents’
subjective belief that the suspect was the focus of a criminal
investigation was irrelevant in determining whether the questioning
was custodial.134
Even in United States v. Leon, a case that, according to one
commentator, “likely reflects the Supreme Court’s greatest deference
to police officer intent,”135 the Court demanded an objective
standard—the officer's reasonable reliance—to excuse acting on a
warrant that was later invalidated.136
More recently in Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Court reinforced its
preference for objectivity regarding Miranda, stating plainly: “The
Miranda custody inquiry is an objective test . . . The objective test
furthers ‘the clarity of [Miranda’s] rule’”137
The above cases make clear that the subjective intentions of law
enforcement should not be a relevant inquiry in determining whether
statements elicited during two-step interrogations should be
admissible.
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475 U.S. 412, 423–26 (1986).
Id. at 423.
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425 U.S. 341 (1976).
134
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Joëlle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v.
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C. The Intent-Based Test Erodes Miranda’s Protections
The intent-based test erodes the protections of Miranda by
creating a hopeless situation where defendants must convince courts
that specific police officers acted in bad faith by initially withholding
the Miranda warnings. This allegation can be easily rebutted by the
officer’s testimony that the conduct was inadvertent. Situations are
common where the status of the individual as witness or suspect is
unclear at the time of interrogation, or where the custodial status of the
individual is murky. These circumstances allow an officer to color his
conduct as unintentional and place an undue burden on the defendant
to prove otherwise. This incorrectly diverts the analysis from what is
most fundamental to the Miranda warnings: Whether a reasonable
person in the suspect's shoes would have meaningfully understood the
warnings to convey the message that they retained a real choice about
continuing to speak.138 The objective criteria of the plurality’s factor
based test in Seibert furthers this objective by requiring circumstances
be such that the individual can truly reflect on their decision to invoke
their constitutional right to remain silent and to have counsel present
during questioning.
CONCLUSION
Because the intent-based test is not controlling, is contrary to
precedent, and diminishes the protections endowed upon suspects in
criminal investigations by the Miranda decision, the Seventh Circuit
should take the next opportunity to abandon this test.
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